The Battle of Rorke's Drift, also known as the Defence of Rorke's Drift, was an engagement in the Anglo-Zulu War. The successful British defence of the Swedish mission station and British supply depot at Rorke's Drift, it was carried out by a vastly outnumbered British force under the command of Lieutenants John Chard of the Royal Engineers and Gonville Bromhead of the 24th Regiment of Foot. It holds the record for the largest number of Victoria Crosses awarded for a single battle. After a large contingent of Zulu warriors broke off from the main force during the final hours of the British defeat at the day-long Battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879, they travelled ten kilometres (six miles) to attack Rorke's Drift later that day, with fighting continuing into the following day.
Just over 150 British and colonial troops defended the station against attacks by 3,000 to 4,000 Zulu warriors. The massive but piecemeal attacks by the Zulu on Rorke's Drift came very close to overwhelming the much smaller garrison, but were consistently repelled. Eleven Victoria Crosses were awarded to individual defenders, along with a number of other decorations and honours.
Prelude Rorke's Drift, known as Morris, p. 168. ("Jim's Land") in the Zulu language, was a mission station of the Church of Sweden, and the former trading post of James Rorke, a merchant from the Eastern Cape of Irish descent. It was located near a drift, or ford, on the Buffalo (Mzinyathi) River, which at the time formed the border between the British colony of Natal and the Zulu Kingdom. On 9 January 1879, the British No. 3 (Centre) Column, under Lord Chelmsford, arrived and encamped at the drift.
On 11 January, the day after the British ultimatum to the Zulus expired, the column crossed the river and encamped on the Zulu bank. A small force consisting of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot (2nd/24th) under Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead was detailed to garrison the post, which had been turned into a supply depot and hospital under the overall command of Brevet Major Henry Spalding, 104th Foot, a member of Chelmsford's staff.
On 20 January, after reconnaissance patrolling and building of a track for its wagons, Chelmsford's column marched to Isandlwana, approximately to the east, leaving behind the small garrison. A large company of the 2nd/3rd Natal Native Contingent (NNC) under Captain William Stevenson was ordered to remain at the post to strengthen the garrison.Knight 1996, p. 23, "The post was guarded by one company of 2/24 ... and a company of the NNC ...". This company numbered between 100 and 350 men.Estimates vary: Thompson 2006, p. 65, gives 100. Knight 1996, p. 27, gives 100 to 300. Knight, Ian. Greaves, Adrian, (ed.). Redcoats and Zulus, 2004, p. 116.
Captain Thomas Rainforth's G Company of the 1st/24th Foot was ordered to move up from its station at Helpmekaar, to the southeast, after its own relief arrived, to further reinforce the position. Later that evening a portion of the No. 2 Column under Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford, late of the Royal Engineers, arrived at the drift and camped on the Zulu bank, where it remained through the next day.
Late on the evening of 21 January, Durnford was ordered to Isandlwana, as was a small detachment of No. 5 Field Company, Royal Engineers, commanded by Lieutenant John Chard, which had arrived on the 19th to repair the pontoons that bridged the Buffalo. Chard rode ahead of his detachment to Isandlwana on the morning of 22 January to clarify his orders, but was sent back to Rorke's Drift with only his wagon and its driver to construct defensive positions for the expected reinforcement company, passing Durnford's column en route in the opposite direction.
Some time around noon on 22 January, Major Spalding left the station for Helpmekaar to ascertain the whereabouts of Rainforth's G Company, which was now overdue. He left Chard in temporary command. Chard rode down to the drift itself where the engineers' camp was located. Soon thereafter, two survivors from Isandlwana – Lieutenant Gert Adendorff of the 1st/3rd NNC and a trooper from the Natal Carbineers – arrived bearing the news of the defeat and that a part of the Zulu impi was approaching the station.
Upon hearing this news, Chard, Bromhead, and another of the station's officers, Acting Assistant Commissary James Dalton (of the Commissariat and Transport Department), held a quick meeting to decide the best course of action – whether to attempt a retreat to Helpmekaar or to defend their current position. Dalton pointed out that a small column, travelling in open country and burdened with carts full of hospital patients, would be easily overtaken and defeated by a numerically superior Zulu force, and so it was soon agreed that the only acceptable course was to remain and fight.
Defensive preparations Once the British officers decided to stay, Chard and Bromhead directed their men to make preparations to defend the station. With the garrison's 400-odd menKnight 1996, p. 28, "With 400 men to build them ..." working diligently a defensive perimeter was quickly constructed out of mealie bags, biscuit boxes and crates of tinned meat. This perimeter incorporated the storehouse, the hospital, and a stout stone kraal. The buildings were fortified, with loopholes (firing holes) knocked through the external walls and the external doors barricaded with furniture.
At about 3:30 p.m., a mixed troop of about 100 Natal Native Horse (NNH) under Lieutenant Alfred Henderson arrived at the station after having retreated in good order from Isandlwana. They volunteered to picket the far side of the Oscarberg (Shiyane), the large hill that overlooked the station and from behind which the Zulus were expected to approach.
With the defences nearing completion and battle approaching, Chard had several hundred men available to him: Bromhead's B Company, Stevenson's large NNC company, Henderson's NNH troop, and various others (most of them hospital patients, but 'walking wounded') drawn from various British and colonial units. Adendorff also stayed, while the trooper who had ridden in with him galloped on to warn the garrison at Helpmekaar.Morris 1998, p. 401
The force was sufficient, in Chard's estimation, to fend off the Zulus. Chard posted the British soldiers around the perimeter, adding some of the more able patients, the 'casuals' and civilians, and those of the NNC who possessed firearms along the barricade. The rest of the NNC, armed only with spears, were posted outside the mealie bag and biscuit box barricade within the stone-walled cattle kraal.
The approaching Zulu force was vastly larger; the uDloko, uThulwana, and inDlondo (regiments) of married men aged in their 30s and 40s and the inDlu-yengwe of young unmarried men mustered 3,000 to 4,000 warriors, none of them engaged during the battle at Isandlwana.Morris 1998, p. 370, "played no part in the battle" This Zulu force was the 'loins' or reserve of the army at Isandlwana and is often referred to as the Undi Corps. It was directed to swing wide of the British left flank and pass west and south of Isandlwana hill itself, in order to position itself across the line of communication and retreat of the British and their colonial allies in order to prevent their escape back into Natal by way of the Buffalo River ford leading to Rorke's Drift.
By the time the Undi Corps reached Rorke's Drift at 4:30 p.m., they had fast-marched some from the morning encampment they had left at around 8 a.m., then to spend some 11.5 hours continuously storming the British fortifications at Rorke's Drift.
Most Zulu warriors were armed with an (short spear) and a nguni shield made of cowhide.Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare University of Nebraska Press, 2002, , p. 462 "They had a national army of twenty-five thousand men equipped with cowhide shields, assegais and clubs." Lock and Quantrill 2005, p. 62: John Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs at the time, on the Zulu army – "Equipment: Each man carries his shield and assegais, and a kaross or blanket if he possesses one, he may also have a war dress of monkey skins or ox tails, this is all." The Zulu army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapon. Some Zulus also had old muskets, antiquated rifles, and some captured Martini-Henrys as used by the defenders, though their marksmanship training was poor, and the supply of powder and shot was low, and of poor quality.
The Zulu attitude towards firearms was that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack."Bourquin, S. Military History Journal, V. 4, No. 4, The Zulu military organization and the challenge of 1879, South African Military History Society, , Dec. 1978. Even though their fire was not accurate, it was responsible for five of the 17 British deaths at Rorke's Drift.Bourquin, S. section 'War of 1879', subsection 'Weapons'Knight 1996, p. 38, "Although the Zulu position was a commanding one – a squad of good shots armed with efficient rifles could have made Chard's position untenable within minutes – the Zulus were neither good shots, nor well armed."
While the Undi Corps had been led by kaMapitha at the Isandlwana battle, the command of the Undi Corps passed to Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande (half-brother of Cetshwayo kaMpande, the Zulu king) when kaMapitha was wounded during the pursuit of British survivors from Isandlwana. Prince Dabulamanzi was considered rash and aggressive, and this characterisation was borne out by his violation of King Cetshwayo's order to act only in defence of Zululand against the invading British soldiers and not carry the war over the border into enemy territory. The Rorke's Drift attack was an unplanned raid rather than any organised counter-invasion, with many of the Undi Corps Zulus breaking off to raid other African kraals and homesteads while the main body advanced on Rorke's Drift.
At about 4:00 p.m., Surgeon James Reynolds, Otto Witt – the Swedish missionary who ran the mission at Rorke's Drift – and army chaplain Reverend George Smith came down from the Oscarberg hillside with the news that a body of Zulus was fording the river to the southeast and was "no more than five minutes away". At this point, Witt decided to depart the station, as his family lived in an isolated farmhouse about away, and he wanted to be with them. Witt's native servant, Umkwelnantaba, left with him; so too did one of the hospital patients, Lieutenant Thomas Purvis of the 1st/3rd NNC.
Battle
At about 4:20 p.m., the battle began with Lieutenant Henderson's NNH troopers, stationed behind the Oscarberg, briefly engaging the vanguard of the main Zulu force.Knight 1996, p. 36, and on p. 88 this is described by Knight as "the first shots of the battle". However, tired from the battle at Isandlwana and retreat to Rorke's Drift as well as being short of carbine ammunition, Henderson's men departed for Helpmekaar. Henderson himself reported to Lieutenant Chard the enemy were close and that "his men would not obey his orders but were going off to Helpmekaar".
Henderson then followed his departing men. Upon witnessing the withdrawal of Henderson's NNH troop, Captain Stevenson's NNC company abandoned the cattle kraal and fled, greatly reducing the strength of the defending garrison.Morris, p. 402. Chadwick, G.A. . Military History Journal, V. 4, No. 4, The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, South African Military History Society, , Jan. 1979. "This reduced the strength of the defenders drastically ..." Outraged that Stevenson and some of his colonial NCOsKnight 1996, p. 45, Corporal Scammell of the NNC is noted as remaining. had also fled from the barricades, a few British soldiers fired after them, killing Corporal William Anderson.